W'e present a formal s\ ntax and semantics for SNePS considered as the (modeled) mind of a cogn:ti\e agent. The semantics is based on a Meinongian theory of' the intensional objects of' thought that is appropriate for 41 considered as "computational philosophy" or "computational psychology".
INTRODUCTION.
W'e present a formal syntax and semantics for the SNePS Semantic Network P recessing System (Shapiro 1979) , based on a \leinongian theory of the intensional objects of thought (Rapaport 198Sa ). Such a theory avoids possible worlds and is appropriate t or AI considered as "computational philosophy"-AI as the study of how intelligence is possible-or "computational psychology"-.ql with the goal of w-riting programs as models of human cognitile behavior.
Recently, SNePS has been used for a variety of AI research and applications projects. These are described in Shapiro k Kapclport 1985, of u hich the present paper is a much shortened version. Here, w-e use SNePS to model (or construct> the mind of a cllgnitive agent, referred to do C.ASSIE (the cognitive Agent of the SNePS System--an Intelligent Bntitv).
INTENSIONAL KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION.
\\ePS represents propositions about entities having properties and standing in relations. Nodes represent the propositions, entities, properties, and relations, while the arcs represent structural links kt \veen these. S?WS nodes might represent extensional entities, whose identity conditions do not depend on their manner of representation.
Two extensional entities are equivalent (for some purpose) iff they are identical (i.e., iff "they" are really one entity, not two>. Although S?(ePS can be used to represent extensional entities in the world, we believe that it must represent intensional entities-entities whose identity conditions do depend on their manner of representation. Two intensional entities might be equivalent (for some purpose) without being identical (i.e., they might really be two, not one). Only if one wants to represent the relations between a mind and the world would it also have to represent extensional entities (Rapaport 1978 , McCarthy 1979 . If S\ePS is used just to represent a mind-i-e., a mind's model of the wjoorld--then it does not need to represent any extensional objects. It can then be used either to model the mind of a particular cogniti\e agent or to build such a mind-i.e., to be a cognitive agent itself (Vaida & Shapiro 1982 1. There have been a number of arguments presented in both rhe 41 and philosophical literature in the past few years for rife tieed I or in'en\ional entities (Castaiieda 1974 . Woods 1975 . Maidn It. Sh,rp~rc~ 1982 a mind can have an object of thought that corresponds to no extensional object. Again to take several classic examples, cognitive agents can think and talk about fictional objects such as Santa Claus, possible but non-existing objects such as a golden mountain, impossible objects such as a round square, and possible but not-yet-proven-to-exist objects such as theoretical entities (e.g., black holes).
If nodes only represent intensions (and extensional entities are not represented in the network), how do they link up to the external, extensional world 3 One answer is by means of a LES arc (see (Syn.1) and (Sem.l), below): The nodes at the head of the IL\ arc are au,. (the user's> interpretation of the node at its tail. The network without the 1,1'S arcs and their head-nodes displa.vs the strucfure of CASSIH's mind (Carnap 1928, Sect. 14; for other answers, see Maida & Shapiro 1982 , Shapiro & Rapaport 1985 .
DESCRIPTION OF SNePS.
';YePS satisfies the Uniqueness Principle: There is a one-to-one correspondence between nodes and represented concepts. This principle guarantees that nodes represent intensional ob;jects and that nodes will be shared whenever possible. Nodes that only have arcs pointing to them are considered to be unstructured or at omit. They include: (1) sensory nodes, which-when SNePS is being used to model a mind-represent interfaces with the external world (in the examples that follow, they represent utterances); (2) base nodes, which represent individual concepts and properties; and (3) variable nodes, which represent arbitrary individuals (Fine 1983) (Shapiro 1978; Shapiro & McKay 1980; Mchav & Shapiro 1981; Shapiro, Martins, CEr McKay 1982) . For each of the three categories of molecular nodes (structured individuals, atomic propositions, and rules), there are constant nodes of that category and pattern nodes of that category representmg arbitrary entities of that category.
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There are a few built-in arc labels, used mostly for rule nodes.
Paths of arcs can be defined, allowing for path-based inference, including property inheritance w.ithin generalization hierarchies (see below; Shapiro 1978 , Srihari 1981 . All other arc labels are defined by the user, typically at the beginning of an interaction with SNePS.
CASSIE-A Model of a Mind.
Since most arcs are user-defined, users are obligated to pro\-ide a formal syntax and semantics for their Sh'ePS networks.
We shall describe the way in which we have been using S>ePS to build tY.4SSllF. Lsing Brachman's (1979) terminology, insofar as SNePS is a semantic network system at the logical level and can thus be used to define one at the epistemological or conceptual level, CASSIl: is SiePS being used at a conceptual level.
The nodes represent the objects of CASSIE's thoughts-the things she thinks about, the properties and relations with which she characterizes them, her beliefs, etc. (Maida & Shapiro 1982 , Rapaport 1985a ). The Principle of Displacement says that a cognitive agent is able to think about virtually anything, including fictional objects, possible but non-existing objects. and impossible obpcts.
Any theory that would account for this requires a nonstandard logic, and its semantics cannot be limited to merely possible w orlds.
Theories based on Alexius Ileinong's Theory of Objects are of precisely this hind.
2leinong held that psychological experiences consist in part of a psychological act (such as thinking, believing, wishing, etc.) and the object to which the act is directed (e.g., the object that is thought about or the proposition that is believed). Two kinds of 'Meinongian objects of thought are relevant for us: (1) The objectum, or object of "simple" thoughts:
Santa Claus is the objecturn of John's act of thinking of Santa Claus. The meaning of a noun phrase is an objectum.
(2) The objective, or object of belief, knowledge, etc.: that Santa Claus is thin is the objective of John's act of believing that Santa Claus is thin. Objectives are like propositions in that they are the meanings of sentences and other sentential structures.
Note that objecta need not exist and that objectives need not be true. (Cf. Meinong 1904; Rapaport 1978 Rapaport , 1981 Castaiieda 1974 Castaiieda , 1975 Routley 1979; Parsons 1980; Lambert 1983; Zalta 1983.) This is, perhaps, somewhat arcane terminology for w-hat might seem lihe AI common sense. But without an underlying theory, such as Meinong's, there is no way to be sure if common sense can be trusted.
It is important to note that not only are all represented things intensional, but that they are all obJects of ('.~SSIE's mental acts; i.e., they are all in CASSIE's mind (her "belief space")-they are all intent ional. 'I'hus, even if CASSIE represents the beliefs of someone else (e.g., John's belief that Lucy IS rich, as in the conversation in Sect. 3.2), the objects that she represents as being in that person's mind (as being in his "belief space") are actually CASSIE's representations of those objects-i.e., they are in CASSIE's mind.
A Conversation with CASSIE.
Before giving the syntax and semantics of the case-frames employed in representing CASSIE's "mind", we present a conversation we had with her, showing the network structure as it is built-i.e., showing the structure of CASSIE's mind as she is given information and as she infers new information. An ATN parser/generator (Shapiro 1982) [CASSIE can answer the question using the class hierarchy, because, prior to the conversation, an inheritance rule was given to SNePS. The rule says that the CLASS arc is implied by the path consisting of a CLASS arc followed by zero or more occurrences of the two-arc path consisting of the converse SUBCLASS arc followed by the SUPERCLASS arc (Shapiro 1978 , Srihari 1981 [This and the next two Inputs are given to establl5h more of the class hierarchy and to make it clear that when <:.4SSII: answers the last question of this session, she is doing both path-based reasoning and node-based reasoning at the same tlme.1 was answered using path-based lnferenclng to deduce that I.ucy and John are people and that Rover is a pet, and node-ba<ed inferencing to Conclude that. therefore, I-ucy and John lo\ e Ro\ er.]
PROPER -NAME OBJECT
is a net\,-orh and 1n is a structured proposition node.
(Sem.5)
m is the objective corresponding to the proposition that objectum i's proper name is j. (j is the objectum that IS i's prt'per name: its expression in English IS represented by a node at the head of a LEN-arc emanating from j.)
Syntax and Semantics of SNePS.
In thl\ sectlon, LX e gi\ e the syntax and semantic% of the nodes and e\rL\ used In the Interaction. \Vhat me present here is our current mL,del: \xe mahe no claims to completeness of the representational xheme.
\L'e begin with a few rough definitions. ((Yf. Shapiro 1979, 5eeLt. 2.1. for more precise ones.) (Def. 1) A node do?ninates another node if there is a path of directed arcs from the first node to the second node.
(Syn.6)
If i and j are individual nodes and "?n" is an Identifier not previously used, then
CLASS MEMBER
IS a nets-ork and ~tz is a structured proposition node.
correspondi ng to the proposition that i (Sem.6) I)Z is the objective is a (member of class) j.
(Def. 2) A pattern node is a node that dominates a variable node.
(Def. 3) An individual node is either a base node, a variable node, or a structured constant or pattern indil~idual node.
(Def. 4) A proposition node is either a structured proposition node or an atomic variable node representing an arbitrary proposition.
(Syn.7)
If i and j are Indi\~ldual nodes and "m" IS an identifier not previously used. then
SUPERCLASS

SUBCLASS
is a network and nz is a structured proposition node.
/
(Syn.1) If "w" is a(n English) Lvord and 2" is an identifier not pre\ 10us1y u5ed, then
LEX a-----B@
proposition that
(Sem.7)
772 is the objective corresponding to the (the class of') is are (a subclass of the class of) js. Rapaport 1984b , Rapaport & Shapiro 1984 . The ETIME and STIME arcs are optional and can be part of any proposition node; they are a provisional technique for handling temporal information-cf. Shapiro & Rapaport 1985.) (Sem.8) m is the objective corresponding to the proposition that agent i , performs act i z with respect to i 3 starting at time t 1 and ending at time t 2, where t , is before t *. Rule nodes have been described more fully in Shapiro 1979 , and a full syntax and semantics for them is presented in Shapiro and Rapaport 1985 . Here, we present the syntax and semantics only for the node-based inference rule used in the conversation with CASSIE (Fig. 2 , node m56):
If a,, . . . , a,, C,, . . . , Cj, and d,, . . . , dk are PrOpOSitiOn nodes (n, j, k 1 0), and "T " is an identifier not previously used, then is a network, and T is a rule node.
(Sem.9) r is the objective correspondmg to the proposition that the conjunction of the propositions a ,, , . , a, relevantly implies each cl (1 5 1 I j) and relevantly implies edch dl (1 I1 5 k) for which there is not a better reason to belie1.e it is false. (The dl are default consequences: each is Implied only if it is neither the case that CASSIE already believes not dl nor that not di follows from non-default rules.) (Syn.10) If r is a rule node, and I-dominates variable nodes Vl, * . . , v,, and, in addition, arcs labeled "AVB" go from r to each vi, then r.-is a quantified rule node.
(Sem.10) f' is the objective corresponding to the proposition that the rule that would be expressed by T without the AVB arcs holds after replacing each vi by any object in its range.
SNePS AND CASSIE AS SEMANTIC NETWORKS.
We conclude by looking at SKePS from the perspective of Brachman's discussions of structured inheritance networks and hierarchies of semantic-network formalisms (Brachman 1977 (Brachman , 1979 (Tranchell 1982) .
A semantic network should have a semantics. We presented that in Sect. 3.3. But there are at least two sorts of semantics. SYePS nodes have a meaning within the system in terms of their links to other nodes; they have a meaning so?-users as provided by nodes dt the heads of LES arcs. Arcs, on the other hand, only have meaning within the system, provided by node-and pathbased inference rules (which can be thought of as procedures that operate on the arcs). In both cases, there is an "internal", system's semantics that is holistic and structural: the meaning Of the nodes and arcs are not given in isolation, but in terms of the entire network.
This sort of "syntactic" semantics differs from a semantics that provides links to an external interpreting system, such as a user or the "world''--I.e.. links between the network's way Of representing information dnd the user's a'ay. It is the latter Sort of semantics that we provided for ('.1%SIE u!lth respect to an ontology of Meinongian uhJects, which are not to be tahen as representing things in the world. C4SSIE's ontology 1s an epislemological ontology (Rapaport 1985 (Rapaport '1986 of the purely intensional items that enable a cognitive agent to h'l\o l~?Iiefs about the world.
It is a theory of what there must be In clrdel for a cognitiye agent to ha\Te beliefs about \vhat there is. 
